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Robbins: Parents Allowed to Recover Damages for Loss of Companionship and

CASENOTES

TORTS-Wrongful Death-Parents Allowed To Recover
Damages for Loss of Companionship and Society As Well
As Damages for Mental Anguish for Death of Minor
Child Under Texas Wrongful Death Act.
Sanchez v. Schindler,
651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983).
Johnny Sanchez, age fourteen, died as a result of injuries received in an
automobile accident in 1979.' Mr. and Mrs. Sanchez sought damages sustained by them under the Texas Wrongful Death Act.2 The jury found that
the Sanchezes suffered no pecuniary loss resulting from the death of their
son but still awarded Mrs. Sanchez $102,500 damages for mental anguish.'
Disregarding the jury determination, the trial court denied recovery for
mental anguish and the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed.' On
appeal to the Texas Supreme Court the appellant, Mrs. Sanchez, sought
the jury award for mental anguish damages.5 Held-Reversed. Parents are
allowed to recover damages for loss of companionship and society, as well
as damages for mental anguish, for the death of a minor child under the
Texas Wrongful Death Act.6
Lord Campbell's Act was passed into law in England in 1846 to provide

1. See Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 250 (Tex. 1983).
2. See id at 353; see also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 4671-4678 (Vernon 1952 &
Supp. 1982-1983). The Sanchezes also sued as heirs of Johnny Sanchez under the express
provisions of Texas' survival statute. See Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 250 (Tex.
1983); see also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5525 (Vernon 1958).

3. See Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 250 (Tex. 1983). Additionally, the jury
award to the estate included: (I) $50,000 for the pain and suffering of the decedent from the
time of the accident until his death, (2) $7,187.41 for his medical care, (3) $4000 in funeral
and burial expenses, and (4) $450 for damage to his motorcycle. See id at 250.
4. See Sanchez v. Schindler, 626 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1981),
rev'd, 651 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Tex. 1983).
5. See Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 250 (Tex. 1983).
6. See id at 254.
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a cause of action for designated beneficiaries of a person killed by wrongful act, neglect, or default.7 The language of the Act itself did not limit the
scope of damages that a jury could award.8 Shortly after its enactment the
language was judicially interpreted to restrict recovery to pecuniary loss,
that is, loss of financial contributions and not damages for mental suffering.9 Following the lead of New York in 1847,1 ° all states have since enacted wrongful death statutes,"1 most of which were initially patterned
7. See Lord Campbell's Act (Fatal Accidents Act), 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93, reprinted
in 2 S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 643-44 (2d ed. 1975). Prior to the enactment of Lord Campbell's Act, the common law rule, as expressed by Lord Ellenborough,
was that there could be no recovery for wrongful death. See Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep.
1033, 1033 (K.B. 1808). The general purpose of the Act was to provide a right of action
whereby the family of the decedent could be compensated for their loss by the person responsible for it. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 901-02 (4th ed. 1971)
(Lord Campbell's Act enacted to avoid harshness of common law rule denying wrongful
death recovery). For a discussion of the origin of the cause of action for wrongful death, see
generally Strong & Jacobsen, Such Damagesas Are Just.- A ProposalforMore Realistic Compensation in Wrongful Death Cases, 43 MONT. L. REV. 55, 57 (1982).
8. See Lord Campbell's Act (Fatal Accidents Act), 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93, reprinted
in 2 S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 643-44 (2d ed. 1975). Lord Campbell's

Act provides in pertinent part:
§ I [Wihensoever the Death of a Person shall be caused by wrongful Act, Neglect, or
Default, and the Act, Neglect, or Default is such as would (if Death had not ensued)
have entitled the Party injured to maintain an Action and recover Damages in respect
thereof, then and in every such Case, the Person who would have been liable if Death
had not ensued shall be liable to an action for Domages, notwithstanding the Death of
the Person injured ..... § 2 [Elvery such Action shall be for the Benefit of the Wife,
Husband, Parent, and Child of the Person whose Death shall have been so caused, and
shall be brought by and in the name of the Executor or Administrator of the Person
deceased; and in every such Action the Jury may give such Damages as they may think
proportioned to the Injury resulting from such Death to the Parties respectively for
whom and for whose Benefit such Action shall be brought; and the Amount so recovered, after deducting the Costs not recovered from the Defendant, shall be divided
amongst the beforementioned Parties in such Shares as the Jury by their Verdict shall
find and direct.
Id, reprintedin 2 S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 643 (2d ed. 1975).
9. See Blake v. The Midland Ry. Co., 118 Eng. Rep. 35, 41 (Q.B. 1852). The court in
Blake held that:
The measure of damage is not the loss or suffering of the deceased, but the injury resulting from his death to his family. This language seems more appropriate to a loss of
which some estimate may be made than to an indefinite sum, independent of all pecuniary estimate, to sooth the feelings .

. .

. It seems to us that, if the legislature had in-

tended to go the extreme length of giving, not only compensation for pecuniary loss, but
a solatium to all relations enumerated. . . language more clear and appropriate for this
purpose would have been employed.
Id at 41.
10. 1847 N.Y. Laws ch. 450.
11. See ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-391, 6-5-410 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 9.55.580 (1962); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-611 to -613 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-906 to -909 (1979); CAL.
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after Lord Campbell's Act. 2 Today, however, the majority of states permit
additional recovery of one or more "relational" damages, such as loss of3
society, comfort, protection, counsel, companionship, or affection.'

Civ. PROC. CODE § 377 (Deering Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-21-201 to -204
(1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-555 (West Supp. 1983-1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 3721-3725 (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 768.16-.27 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 105-1301 to -1310 (1968 & Supp. 1980); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 663-3 to -8 (1976);
IDAHO CODE § 5-311 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 1-2 (Smith-Hurd 1959 & Supp.
1983-1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-1-2 (West Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.336
(West Supp. 1983-1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-1901 to -1905 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT.
§§ 411.130-.145 (1972 & Supp. 1980); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art.,2315 (West Supp. 1983); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-804 (1964 & Supp. 1982-1983); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. §§ 3-901 to -904 (1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 229 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp.
1983); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2922 (Callaghan 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 573.02 (West
Supp. 1983); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 537.070-.090
(Vernon 1949 & Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-323 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30809 to -810 (1943); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.085 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 556:12 (1974);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:31-1 to :31-6 (West 1952 & Supp. 1983-1984); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 41-2-1 to -4 (1978); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 5-4.1 to -4.6 (McKinney 1981 &
Supp. 1982-1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-21-01
to -06 (1976 & Supp. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2125.01-.04 (Baldwin 1982); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1053 (West Supp. 1982-1983); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.010-.100 (1981); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8301 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-7-1 to -13 (1969 &
Supp. 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-51-10 to -60 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 21-5-1 to -9 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-113 (1980); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. arts. 4671-4678 (Vernon 1952 & Supp. 1982-1983); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-11-6 to -7
(1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 1491-1492 (1974 & Supp. 1982); VA. CODE §§ 8.01-50 to 56 (1950 & Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.010 (Supp. 1983-1984) and
§ 4.20.005 (1962 & Supp. 1983-1984); W. VA. CODE §§ 55-7-5 to -7 (1981 & Supp. 1983);
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 895.03-.04 (West 1983); Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-38-101 to -102 (1977).
12. See, e.g., Wycko v. Gnodtke, 105 N.W.2d 118, 119 (Mich. 1960) (predecessor of

American wrongful death acts was Lord Campbell's Act); Anderson v. Lale, 216 N.W.2d
152, 155 (S.D. 1974) (South Dakota's statute originated from section 677 of 1877 Code of
Civil Procedure, which had adopted version of Lord Campbell's Act); Jones v. Carvell, 641
P.2d 105, 107 (Utah 1982) (Utah's wrongful death statute patterned after Lord Campbell's
Act).
13. See, e.g., Swanson v. Champion Int'l Corp., 646 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Mont. 1982) (consortium, comfort, society); Nance v. State Bd. of Educ., 282 S.E.2d 848, 849 (S.C. 1981)
(mental shock and suffering, wounded feelings, grief, sorrow, loss of society and companionship); Van Cleave v. Lynch, 166 P.2d 244, 249 (Utah 1946) (society, love, companionship,
protection, affection of minor child). The pecuniary value of the household services the beneficiaries reasonably expected to receive from the decedent is universally accepted by the
states as an element of loss to be figured into the computation of wrongful death damages.
See, e.g., Vines v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 337 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Ark. 1960) (widow
entitled to recover for loss of service of deceased husband); Marceleno v. State Dep't of
Highways, 367 So. 2d 882, 889 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (loss of wife-mother's services, such as
cooking, cleaning, housekeeping recoverable); Fussner v. Andert, 113 N.W.2d 355, 357
(Minn. 1961) (father entitled to present monetary value of any future contributions in services of 17-year-old daughter).
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Whether the state classifies these types of damages as pecuniary or nonpecuniary, the current trend is towards allowing for deprivation of positive
benefit.4 On the other hand, the majority of American jurisdictions still do
not include the attendant emotional consequences suffered by the
survivors.l

The Texas legislature enacted a wrongful death act patterned after Lord
Campbell's Act in 1860.16 The statute provides for the recovery of "actual
14. See I S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 3:49, at 308-22 (2d ed.

1975) (modern trend toward allowing recovery for companionship, comfort, and consortium); see also Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 587-88 (1974) (permitting
recovery for loss of society under maritime law thereby al.lgning remedy with wrongful
death statutes of most states). The action of a state with regard to awarding damages generally falls into one of three categories:
(1) A strict application of the pecuniary loss standard to include only loss of expected
financial support and services. See Espinoza v. O'Dell, 633 P.2d 455, 464 (Colo. 1981) (damages limited to reasonably expected financial benefit from decedent);
(2) A liberal application of the pecuniary loss rule to allow recovery of the pecuniary
value of relational damages. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1974)
(permits recovery of lost pecuniary value of decedent's protection, care, assistance, society,
companionship, comfort, guidance, counsel, advice);
(3) Abrogation of the pecuniary loss requirement. See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-3 (1976)
(damages given for pecuniary injury and loss of love and affection).
15. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 30.020 (1981) (pecuniary loss, loss of society, companionship, services); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1492 (Supp. 1982) (pecuniary injury includes
love and companionship of child, destruction of parent-child relationship); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 4.24.010 (Supp. 1983-1984) (loss of services, support, love, companionship of
child, injury or destruction of parent-child relationship). But see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-909
(1979) (mental anguish); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3724 (Supp. 1982) (mental anguish);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.21 (West Supp. 1983) (mental pain and suffering); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-1904 (1976) (mental anguish, suffering, or bereavement); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 3-904 (1980) (mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering); NEV. REV. STAT.

§ 41.085 (1979) (grief or sorrow); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02 (Baldwin 1982) (mental
anguish); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1053 (West Supp. 1982-1983) (grief, mental pain and

suffering); VA. CODE § 8.01-52 (Supp. 1983) (sorrow, mental anguish, solace); W. VA. CODE
§ 55-7-6 (Supp. 1983) (sorrow, mental anguish, solace). Additionally, a few states allow for
recovery by judicial application of statutory law. See, e.g., City of Tucson v. Wondergem,
466 P.2d 383, 388 (Ariz. 1970) (widow entitled to recover for anguish, sorrow, mental suffering); Nance v. State Bd. of Educ., 282 S.E.2d 848, 849 (S.C. 1981) (statutory beneficiaries
permitted to recover for pecuniary loss, mental shock, and suffering); Wilson v. Lund, 491
P.2d 1287, 1290 (Wash. 1971) (language of statute construed "to provide recovery for paren-

tal grief, mental anguish, and suffering").
16. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 4671-4678 (Vernon 1952 & Supp. 1982-1983).
The language regarding the measure of damages recoverable in the original Texas death act
was taken verbatim from Lord Campbell's Act. Compare Lord Campbell's Act (Fatal Accidents Act), 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93, § 2, reprinted in 2 S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 644 (2d ed. 1975) ("[T]he Jury may give such Damages as they may think
") with Law of Feb. 2, 1860, ch.
proportioned to the Injury resulting from such Death ..
35, § 2, 1860 Tex. Gen. Laws 33, 4 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1395 (1898) ("[Tlhe jury
may give such damage as they may think proportioned to the injury resulting from such
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damages" by designated survivors in the event of death of a child or an
adult. 7 The settled judicial construction has been that "actual damages"
means pecuniary loss suffered as a result of the death.'" Pecuniary loss has
been given broad judicial interpretation to encompass not only loss of expected financial contributions from the decedent but also loss of benefits
that can be valued in money, including household services, advice, attention, care, counsel, and protection.' 9 When the decedent is a minor child,
the parent's recovery is diminished by the anticipated amount of expense
of the child's care, support, education, and maintenance.2 ° Texas, along
death .... "). See generally Ferguson, Damages/orthe Death of a Minor Child Under the
Texas WrongfulDeath.Act, 4 ST. MARY'S L.J. 157, 157-62 (1972) (history and application by
courts of wrongful death act).
17. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4671 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (action for
"actual damages" in wrongful death); see also id art. 4677 (Vernon 1952) (damages in proportion to the injury suffered due to death).
18. See March v. Walker, 48 Tex. 372, 375 (1877), expressly overruled in Sanchez v.
Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 251 n.2 (Tex. 1983). March was the first case to interpret actual
damages to mean pecuniary losses. The rationale of the court was that the Texas Wrongful
Death Act was based on the English statute which had been interpreted to allow only for
pecuniary damage; therefore, the Texas act would only allow for recovery of the same, "including the loss of prospective advantage." See id at 375. Courts have long adhered to the
pecuniary loss rule. See, e.g., Murray v. Templeton, 576 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1978, no writ) (recovery for surviving husband limited to pecuniary loss less cost
of maintaining wife); Simpson v. Barham, 292 S.W.2d 874, 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1956, no writ) (husband only allowed to recover amount of pecuniary benefits reasonably
expected to be recovered from wife had she not died); Banker v. McLaughlin, 200 S.W.2d
699, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont) (parent entitled to recover only pecuniary value of
child's services and financial contributions less cost of raising child), aft'd, 208 S.W.2d 843
(1948), overruled by Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983).
19. See, e.g., Dover Corp. v. Perez, 587 S.W.2d 761, 768 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (widow may recover future pecuniary loss and loss of care,
maintenance, support, services, advice, and counsel); Lee v. Andrews, 545 S.W.2d 238, 248
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ dism'd) (widow, individually, and on behalf of minor
children, awarded compensation for services, advice, counsel, care, and financial contributions); Page v. Scaramozi, 288 S.W.2d 909, 912 (lex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1956, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (children, for loss of father, entitled to recover for loss of nurture, advice, care,
education, and pecuniary loss). "[P]ecuniary loss.., is the present monetary value of the
benefits that the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of receiving from the deceased had he
not been killed. This includes not only money but everything that can be valued in money."
Exxon Corp. v. Breecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170, 184 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]), rev'd
on other grounds, 526 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. 1975).
20. See Bedgood v. Madalin, 600 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1980), overruled by Sanchez v.
Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983). The court in Madalin stated that:
It is well settled that under the Texas Wrongful Death Act a surviving parent is entitled
to recover as actual damages for the death of a child only the pecuniary value of the
child's services until he reaches his majority, less the cost and expense of the child's
care, support, education and maintenance and such sums as might be reasonably expected as contributions after the child reaches majority.
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with a minority of other states, has denied recovery for the loss of companionship and society and damages for mental anguish because these elements have been considered incapable of pecuniary assessment. 2'
In recent years, the Texas Supreme Court, in two cases, has moved to
expand the list of recoverable damages available when a tortious act negligently interferes with a familial relationship.2 2 In Whittlesey v. Miller,2 3 a
case involving injury to a spouse by a third party's negligence, the court
held that a cause of action is available to either spouse for loss of consortium. 24 Consortium is the mutual right of the spouses to the "affection,
solace, comfort, companionship, society, assistance, and sexual relations
necessary to a successful marriage. '' 25 This holding marked the first time
the court determined that these relational elements were capable of pecuniary evaluation. 26 Two years later, in Bedgood v. Madalin,27 a case involving the death of a minor child, Justice Spears advocated a rejection of
the pecuniary loss limitation in wrongful death actions. 28 He noted that

Id at 775. See generally Ferguson, Damagesforthe Death ofa Minor Child Under the Texas
Wrongful Death Act, 4 ST. MARY'S L.J. 157, 162-67 (1972) (examination of pecuniary loss
requirement on damages recoverable for death of minor child).
21. See, e.g., Tex-Jersey Oil Corp. v. Beck, 157 Tex. 541, 551, 305 S.W.2d 162, 169
(1957) (jury may not consider sorrow, grief, loss of companionship, love, and affection in
assessing wrongful death damages); International & G.N. Ry. Co. v. McVey, 99 Tex. 28, 32,
87 S.W. 328, 329 (1905) (jury charge which did not exclude compensation for loss of society
or companionship in wrongful death action reversible error), expressly overruled in Sanchez
v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 251 n.2 (Tex. 1983); Penguin Indus., Inc. v. Junge, 589 S.W.2d
842, 848 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ retd n.r.e.) (damages for grief, mental anguish,

bereavement, and loss of companionship not recoverable); see also I STATE

BAR OF TEXAS,

12.08 (1969):
In answering Issues No. -, No. -, and No. -, do not allow any amount by way of
consolation for the death of PaulPayne or for any sorrow, anguish, or grief suffered as a
result of his death, or for the loss of the society, affection, or companionship of Paul
Payne.
Id. at 12.08.
22. See Bedgood v. Madalin, 600 S.W.2d 773, 776 (Tex. 1980) (Spears, J.,
concurring)
(death of minor child), overruledby Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983); Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1978) (injury to spouse).
23. 572 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1978).
24. See id at 668. The spouse sued the person involved in a collision with her husband
for loss of consortium for the alleged negligent injury to him. See id.at 666.
25. See id at 666; see also Whitley v. Whitley, 436 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, no writ).
26. Compare Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 667-68 (Tex. 1978) (cause of action
for loss of consortium) with Garrett v. Reno Oil Co., 271 S.W.2d 764, 766 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1954, writ refd n.r.e.) (wife has no cause of action for third party's negligent
injury to husband).
27. 600 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1980) (Spears, J., concurring), overruled by Sanchez v.
Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983).
28. See id at 777. For a discussion of how broad judicial construction has prompted
TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC
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both a parent's claim for damages for the loss of a minor child and a
spouse's cause of action for loss of consortium involve serious interference
with a familial relationship.2 9 Therefore, he reasoned that the elements of
damage recoverable by a surviving parent should be expanded, as they
were in Whirtlesey, to include "loss of companionship, society, affection,
and comfort."3 ° Jury awards for the death of a minor child in Texas in
recent years have been greater than a strict application of the pecuniary
loss rule would seemingly justify. 3 This phenomena has led commentators
to suggest that juries, with tacit court approval, in fact have been compensating parents for their grief
and loss of love and companionship under the
32
guise of pecuniary loss.
In Sanchez v. Schindler,3 3 the Texas Supreme Court rejected the pecuniary loss rule as the proper measure of damage for the death of a child, and
in so doing, reinterpreted the language of the Texas Wrongful Death
Act. 34 The statutory language of "actual damage" was interpreted to in-

legislatures to modify or abrogate the pecuniary loss rule, see generally Belfance, The Inadequacy of Pecuniary Loss as a Measure of Damages in Actions for the Wrongful Death of
Children, 60 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 543, 553 (1979).
29. See Bedgood v. Madalin, 600 S.W.2d 773, 778 (Tex. 1980) (Spears, J., concurring),
overruled by Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983).
30. See id at 779.
31. See, e.g., Green v. Hale, 590 S.W.2d 231, 237 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (jury award of $4,500 for 13-year-old boy upheld), overruled by Sanchez v.
Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983); Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486, 492 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1978, writ refd n.r.e.) (jury award of $25,000 for death of bright, active,
loving 14-month-old not excessive), overruled by Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex.
1983); Collins v. Gladden, 466 S.W.2d 629, 637 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1971, writ retd
n.r.e.) ($20,000 verdict for 18-year-old reduced to $17,000 by court). The cost of raising an
urban child from birth to age eighteen in 1982 averaged $85,949 nationwide; the cost of
raising a rural nonfarm child averaged $87,200. See Updated Estimates of the Cost ofRaising
a Child, 2 FAM. EcON. REV. 26, 27 (1983); see also Decof, Damages in Actionsfor Wrongful
Death of Children, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 197, 198 (1971) (most jurisdictions deduct cost of
rearing child from probable contribution). Damages awarded when the deceased is a minor
child must necessarily be largely speculative; therefore, the jury is given wide latitude in
making their determination. See Riojas v. Riojas, 289 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1956, no writ).
32. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 908-09 (4th ed.

1971). Juries must be compensating for prohibited sentimental aspects of family relationships with covert court approval. See id. at 909. Otherwise, parents would receive nothing
because damages calculated following a strict pecuniary standard could only result in a negative quantity. See id at 909; see also Ferguson, Damagesfor the Death of a Minor Child
Under the Texas Wrongful Death Act, 4 ST. MARY'S L.J. 157, 165 (1972) (juries ignore pecuniary loss rule and permit parents compensation for loss of comfort, love, and
companionship).
33. 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983).
34. See id at 251. The majority lists twenty cases which it overrules with this decision.
See id at 251 n.2. While the language of the court limits its decision to the death of a minor
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clude the loss of the child's companionship and society as well as damages
for the parent's mental anguish." The court determined that the basis of
the pecuniary loss limitation was the antiquated concept of a minor child
as an economic asset, a concept which they considered neither appropriate
nor realistic for today.36 Refusing to be bound by the inaction of the legislature in redefining a concept which had initially been defined by the judiciary, 37 the court reevaluated the "statute in light of present social
realities." 3 8 Accordingly, recovery was expanded to include these elements
of "real loss" to parents, in addition to the loss of financial benefit previously allowed.39
In a lengthy dissent, Chief Justice Pope, joined by two others justices,"
argued that the court should not reinterpret the language of the Texas
Wrongful Death Act in light of the fact that Texas courts have consistently
followed the pecuniary loss rule for over one hundred years.4 He interpreted the legislature's failure to amend the provision of the Texas statute
concerning damages not as legislative inaction, but rather as an indication
child, the overruled cases only include 5 in which the decedent was a child. See Smith v.
Farrington, 117 Tex. 459, 6 S.W.2d 736 (1928); Taylor, B. & H. Ry. Co. v. Warner, 84 Tex.
122, 19 S.W. 449 (1892); Houston City St. Ry. Co. v. Sciacca, 80 Tex. 350, 16 S.W. 31 (1891);
Brunswig v. White, 70 Tex. 504, 8 S.W. 85 (1888); City of Galveston v. Barbour, 62 Tex. 172
(1884).
35. See Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex. 1983). Curiously, the appeal
only claimed damages specifically for mental anguish. See Petitioner's Application for Writ
of Error at 30, Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983).
36. See Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex. 1983).
37. See id at 252. The court cited several justifications for judicially changing prior
interpretation of the statute. See id at 252-53. First, since the court originally imposed the
pecuniary loss limitation, it was logical that they be the body to abolish it. See id at 252.
Second, it was an antiquated doctrine. See id at 252. Third, the court should not be barred
by legislative inaction in the area of tort law which historically has been developed predominantly by the judiciary. See id.at 252. Fourth, the majority of other jurisdictions have
reached the same result in wrongful death actions. See id at 252-53.
38. See id at 251.
39. See id at 251. The holding was given application to all future cases as well as to
those still in the judicial process as of April 27, 1983. See id at 254.
40. See id at 254 (Pope, C.J., dissenting) (Justices McGee and Barrows join in dissenting opinion).
41. See id.at 254-55 (Pope, C.J., dissenting); see also Robinson Sons, Inc. v. Wigart,
431 S.W. 2d 327, 334 (Tex. 1968) (no recovery for loss of society, affection, companionship,
sorrow, anguish, and grief), overruled by Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983);
Gulf, C. & S.F.R. Co. v. Farmer, 102 Tex. 235, 239, 115 S.W. 260, 261 (1909) (only pecuniary loss should be compensated), expressly overruled in Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d
249, 251 n.2 (Tex. 1983); March v. Walker, 48 Tex. 372, 375 (1877) (language of statute
limits damages to those measured by pecuniary injury), expressly overruled in Sanchez v.
Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 251 n.2 (Tex. 1983); Appellees' Brief at 21, Sanchez v. Schindler,
651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983) (court is constrained to follow law which prevents plaintiff from
recovering damages for mental suffering).
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that the legislature was satisfied with the present state of the law.42 The
dissent criticized the majority for its failure to clearly set out the proof
required to recover for mental anguish.4 3 Further, if mental anguish was to
be a recoverable element of damage, the dissent cautioned the court to
follow precedent and allow an award only where the plaintiff could show a
physical injury or conduct by the tortfeasor worse than negligence."
With the holding in Sanchez, Texas joins the majority of states which,
regardless of the language of their wrongful death statutes, allow recovery
for loss of companionship and society for the death of a child.45 Recent
opinions by the Texas Supreme Court, combined with the almost universal
criticism of the former approach by legal commentators, foreshadowed
this new interpretation of the death statute.4 An application of the pecuniary loss rule which excluded loss of companionship and society as recoverable elements may have met the needs of a society in which a child was an
economic asset. 47 The Texas Wrongful Death statute, however, must be
viewed in light of present realities. 48 Today, it is the unusual circumstance
See Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 256 (Tex. 1983) (Pope, C.J., dissenting).
See id at 257-58 (Pope, C.J., dissenting).
See id at 258 (Pope, C.J., dissenting).
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377 (Deering Supp. 1983) ("such damages...
as ... may be just"); IDAHO CODE § 5-311 (1979) ("damages may be given as... may be
just"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (Smith-Hurd 1959) ("such damages as they shall deem a
fair and just compensation").
46. Compare Bedgood v. Madalin, 600 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Tex. 1980) (Spears, J., concurring) (antiquated concepts form bases of pecuniary loss rule), overruled by Sanchez v.
Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983) and Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Tex.
1978) (cause of action recognized for spouse's loss of consortium) with Speiser & Malawer,
An American Tragedy.- Damagesfor MentalAnguish of BereavedRelatives in Wrongful Death
Actions, 51 TUL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1976) (inconsistent to allow mental anguish damages in personal injury but not wrongful death cases) and Strong & Jacobsen, Such Damages as Are
Just: A ProposalforMore Realistic Compensation in Wrongful Death Cases, 43 MONT. L.
REv. 55, 56 (1982) (history alone does not justify a rule with no purpose).
47. See Fussner v. Andert, 113 N.W.2d 355, 359 (Minn. 1962).
48. See, e.g., Wycko v. Gnodtke, 105 N.W.2d 118, 121 (Mich. 1960) (time when child
considered primarily as economic asset bleak era in history of childhood); Fussner v.
Andert, 113 N.W.2d 355, 359 (Minn. 1962) (changes in life since pecuniary loss rule adopted
require reappraisal of its meaning and application); Bedgood v. Madalin, 600 S.W.2d 773,
777 (Tex. 1980) (Spears, J., concurring) ("pecuniary loss rule based on antiquated concepts
• . . totally unrelated to present day realities of modem society"), overruled by Sanchez v.
Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983). There is nothing in the statutory language barring
construction to allow for compensation of non-pecuniary elements. See TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 4677 (Vernon 1952) (jury may give such damages as they think proportionate to injury resulting from death). The function of the statute is remedial and it is the
court's duty to construe it liberally in light of current social conditions. Cf. Ward v. Charter
Oak Fire Ins. Co., 579 S.W.2d 909, 910 (Tex. 1979) (worker's compensation law liberally
construed to effect remedies it grants). The Texas "Construction of Laws" article provides in
section 8:
42.
43.
44.
45.
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where a parent suffers any financial loss from the death of a minor child. 9
Texas, therefore, aligns itself with those jurisdictions which recognize that
the real loss to parents is not monetary but the loss of the rewards which
flow from the parent-child relationship.5 °
While the issue before the Sanchez court was the mental anguish of a
parent, a large part of the opinion focused on the loss of companionship
and society of the child."' The emotional reaction of the parent is a byproduct of the injury to the familial relationship; therefore, it was necessary for the court to include these relational elements to arrive at the
desired goal of compensation for mental anguish.52 The petitioner's argument, in fact, includes mental anguish as an integral part of the loss of
companionship and society of the minor.5 3 The court, in another context,
could have joined those states which simply add society and companionship to other pecuniary damages recoverable under a pecuniary loss standard.5 4 Instead, the court chose to additionally allow damages for the
emotional consequences to survivors.5 5 Texas is thereby aligned with the
majority of states which allow compensation for loss of society and coinThe rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof shall be strictly construed shall have no application to the Revised Statutes; but the said statutes shall constitute the law of this State respecting the subjects to which they relate; and the
provisions thereof shall be liberally construed with a view to effect their objects and to
promote justice.
TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 10, § 8 (Vernon 1969).
49. See Decof, Damages in Actionsfor Wrongful Death of Children, 47 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 197, 198 (1971) (normally, child would be economic liability to parent if rule literally
followed); see also Belfance, The Inadequacy of PecuniaryLoss as a Measure of Damages in
Actionsfor the Wrongful Death of Children, 6 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 543, 545 (1979) (under

pecuniary loss measure parent ought to reimburse tortfeasor for relief from expense of raising child).
50. Compare Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex. 1983) (recovery for loss

of society and companionship allowed for death of minor child) with Wardlow v. Keokuk,
190 N.W.2d 439, 448 (Iowa 1971) (loss of society and companionship for wrongful death of
minor proper element) and Selders v. Armentrout, 207 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Neb. 1973) (meas-

ure of damage for wrongful death of minor includes
companionship).

loss of society, comfort,

51. See Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 252-53 (Tex. 1983).

52. Seeid at 253; see also Wilson v. Lund, 491 P.2d 1287, 1292 (Wash. 1971) (destruction of parent-child relationship cannot be separated from emotional damage).
53. See Petitioner's Application for Writ of Error at 24, Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.
2d 249 (Tex. 1983).
54. See, e.g., Vines v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 337 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Ark. 1960)
(pecuniary damage to widow includes loss of companionship); Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11,
14 (Idaho 1982) (compensatory damages for death of minor child include loss of comfort,
society, and companionship); Elliot v. Willis, 412 N.E.2d 638, 640 (Ill. 1980) (reversible error

to not permit estate instruction on lost consortium).
55. See Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Tex. 1983).
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panionship and the minority of jurisdictions which
go a step further in
56
permitting recovery for mental anguish as well.
Damages for loss of companionship and society are no longer considered to be too intangible or speculative to be given a monetary value.5 7
The attendant emotional injuries are also a basis for recovery if proven in
a competent manner.5" A main weakness of the majority opinion, criticized by the dissent, is the failure to elaborate on what specifically constitutes emotional trauma worthy of recovery. 59 As the courts clarify this
standard in the future, the possibility of excessive jury verdicts exists. 60 It

can be anticipated, however, that the verdicts will nonetheless represent a
realistic assessment of damages, due to the supervisory power of the
judiciary.6 1
Sanchez involves the death of a minor child; the holding of the court is
specifically limited to a situation where the decedent is a minor child.6 2
The common thread to the cases listed in the opinion as overruled, however, is not that the decedent was a child but that recovery was limited to
pecuniary lOSS. 63 This fact suggests that the court intended for their holding to have broader implications than the facts at hand and creates a
strong likelihood that the issue will be decided similarly when the decedent
is an adult.' Additionally, two justices, in a concurring opinion on motion
for rehearing, indicated their support for expanding the affect of this decision to all beneficiaries designated by the Texas Wrongful Death statute.6 5
56. See, e.g., City of Tucson v. Wondergem, 466 P.2d 383, 387 (Ariz. 1970) (widow
entitled to recover for anguish, sorrow, mental suffering); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3724
(Supp. 1982) (court may consider mental anguish resulting from death in making award);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1904 (1976) (damages may be recovered for mental anguish, suffering, or bereavement).
57. See Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex. 1978).
58. See Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 253 (Tex. 1983); see also Wilson v.
Lund, 491 P.2d 1287, 1292 (Wash. 1971) (intangible emotional injuries require exacting
proof).
59. See Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 257-58 (Pope, C.J., dissenting).
60. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 907-08 (4th ed. 1971).
61. See, e.g., Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486, 492 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978,
no writ) (award of $25,000 to plaintiff parents not unjustified or excessive), overruled by
Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983); Mitchell v. Akers, 401 S.W.2d 907, 912
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966, writ refd n.r.e.) ($5,000 for physical pain and suffering of
child who died in pool not excessive); Union Transp., Inc. v. Braun, 318 S.W.2d 927, 939
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1958, no writ) (award of $25,000 for death of mother excessive by
$12,500).
62. See Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex. 1983).
63. See id at 251 n.2.
64. Interview with Paul F. Ferguson, Professor of Law, St. Mary's University (June 14,
1983).
65. See Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 258-59 (Tex. 1983) (Ray, J., concurring)
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How the legislature will react to the court's holding can only be a matter of
speculation, but considering their history of inactivity in this wrongful
death damage area, it is likely that they will continue to let the courts interpret the statutory language as new questions arise in the future.6 6
The Texas Supreme Court in Sanchez rejected the pecuniary loss limitation, thereby allowing recovery of damages for the loss of companionship
and society and damages for mental anguish for the death of a minor
child. The court reasoned that the pecuniary loss rule was not appropriate
to modem society and resulted in hardship to the parents who obtained no
recovery if no anticipated financial contribution from the decedent could
be shown. The court recognized that the real loss to the parents is not the
loss of financial benefit expected from the child, but is rather the loss of the
familial relationship, and awarded damages accordingly.
Vicky Halick Robbins

(joined by Justice Kilgarin); see also TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4675 (Vernon 1952)
("husband, wife, children, and parents").
66. Interview with Paul F. Ferguson, Professor of Law, St. Mary's University (June 14,
1983).
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